Helen Warrell, FT investigations reporter
It is July 2027, and China is on the brink of invading Taiwan. Autonomous drones with AI targeting capabilities are primed to overpower the island’s air defenses as a series of crippling AI-generated cyberattacks cut off energy supplies and key communications. In the meantime, a vast disinformation campaign enacted by an AI-powered pro-Chinese meme farm spreads across global social media, deadening the outcry at Beijing’s act of aggression.
Scenarios such as this have brought dystopian horror to the debate about the use of AI in warfare. Military commanders hope for a digitally enhanced force that is faster and more accurate than human-directed combat. But there are fears that as AI assumes an increasingly central role, these same commanders will lose control of a conflict that escalates too quickly and lacks ethical or legal oversight. Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state, spent his final years warning about the coming catastrophe of AI-driven warfare.
Grasping and mitigating these risks is the military priority—some would say the “Oppenheimer moment”—of our age. One emerging consensus in the West is that decisions around the deployment of nuclear weapons should not be outsourced to AI. UN secretary-general António Guterres has gone further, calling for an outright ban on fully autonomous lethal weapons systems. It is essential that regulation keep pace with evolving technology. But in the sci-fi-fueled excitement, it is easy to lose track of what is actually possible. As researchers at Harvard’s Belfer Center point out, AI optimists often underestimate the challenges of fielding fully autonomous weapon systems. It is entirely possible that the capabilities of AI in combat are being overhyped.
Anthony King, Director of the Strategy and Security Institute at the University of Exeter and a key proponent of this argument, suggests that rather than replacing humans, AI will be used to improve military insight. Even if the character of war is changing and remote technology is refining weapon systems, he insists, “the complete automation of war itself is simply an illusion.”
Of the three current military use cases of AI, none involves full autonomy. It is being developed for planning and logistics, cyber warfare (in sabotage, espionage, hacking, and information operations; and—most controversially—for weapons targeting, an application already in use on the battlefields of Ukraine and Gaza. Kyiv’s troops use AI software to direct drones able to evade Russian jammers as they close in on sensitive sites. The Israel Defense Forces have developed an AI-assisted decision support system known as Lavender, which has helped identify around 37,000 potential human targets within Gaza.
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There is clearly a danger that the Lavender database replicates the biases of the data it is trained on. But military personnel carry biases too. One Israeli intelligence officer who used Lavender claimed to have more faith in the fairness of a “statistical mechanism” than that of a grieving soldier.
Tech optimists designing AI weapons even deny that specific new controls are needed to control their capabilities. Keith Dear, a former UK military officer who now runs the strategic forecasting company Cassi AI, says existing laws are more than sufficient: “You make sure there’s nothing in the training data that might cause the system to go rogue … when you are confident you deploy it—and you, the human commander, are responsible for anything they might do that goes wrong.”
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